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A comprehensive study of photon interaction features has been made for some alloys containing Pd and
Ag content to evaluate its possible use as alternative gamma radiations shielding material. The mass
attenuation coefﬁcient (m/r) of the present alloys was measured at various photon energies between 81
keV e 1333 keV utilizing HPGe detector. The measured m/r values were compared to those of theoretical
and computational (MCNPX code) results. The results exhibited that the m/r values of the studied alloys
are in same line with results of WinXCOM software and MCNPX code results at all energies. Moreover,
Pd75/Ag25 alloy sample has the maximum radiation protection efﬁciency (about 53% at 81 keV) and
lowest half value layer, which shows that Pd75/Ag25 has superior gamma radiation shielding perfor-
mance among the compared other alloys.
© 2018 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) is a forum for Nordic
cooperation and competence sharing within nuclear safety and
emergency preparedness, serving as an umbrella for Nordic ini-
tiatives and interests. This initiative dates back to the earlier days of
Nordic nuclear research in the 1950’s. It was built on the foundation
of a common cultural and historical heritage and a long tradition of
collaboration between the Nordic countries, i.e. Denmark
(including the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden. The work in NKS is divided into one program
area for reactor safety (NKS-R), which is presented in this article,
and the other for emergency preparedness (NKS-B). The NKS pro-
grams are ﬁnanced and supported by Nordic authorities, com-
panies and other organisations. Activities are focused towards
practical and directly applicable scientiﬁc results and competence
building of interest for the ﬁnancing organisations. NKS promotes
participation of young scientists in the activities, and also has aby Elsevier Korea LLC. This is andedicated budget for travel support for young scientists. All activ-
ities are documented in technical reports. The results from the
activities within NKS are also made available through seminars,
exercises, scientiﬁc articles and other types of reference material.
More than 500 project reports are available for free download from
the NKS website (www.nks.org) together with, e.g., presentation
material from two large joint NKS-R and NKS-B seminars held in
Stockholm in 2013 and 2016 on Nordic developments after the
Fukushima accident.
Among the Nordic countries, nuclear power plants are operated
in Sweden and Finland, some of which are boiling water reactors
(BWRs) of a common design. As a result, the majority of the ac-
tivities in the NKS-R program are led by Swedish or Finnish orga-
nisations but there is also signiﬁcant participation from Norway
and Denmark where research reactors have been operated for
many years.
The activities of the NKS-R program cover a wide variety of
topics that are funded by NKS through annual calls from an average
budget of 0.5MEUR per year. A requirement for funding fromNKS is
that the activity is co-funded from other sources on at least the
same level as the requested amount. The research areas ‘thermal
hydraulics’ and ‘severe accidents’ have been funded steadily byopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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After the Fukushima accident in 2011, ‘risk analysis and probabi-
listic methods’ together with ‘organisational issues and safety
culture’ have appeared as two areas that have attracted increasing
funding from NKS, both areas now having received an accumulated
funding of nearly 1 MEUR during 2008e2017. In recent years ac-
tivities within the areas of ‘plant life management and extension’ as
well as ‘decommissioning’ have become of growing interest. The
areas of ‘reactor physics’ and ‘automation and control room’ also
receive occasional funding from NKS.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) recently pub-
lished a report on the evaluation of the Swedish participation in the
NKS collaboration during 2008e2015 [1]. The report contains a
thorough investigation of the added value from NKS to nuclear
safety and emergency preparedness in Sweden and in the Nordic
countries. It is concluded that the NKS funding should not be
viewed as basic funding for national research environments.
Instead, the high additionality lies in the support to smaller R&D
projects and pilot projects, which result in valuable collaborations
between multiple Nordic experts.
The NKS projects in the areas of ‘thermal hydraulics’ and ‘se-
vere accidents’ often involve collaborations between experi-
mental and analytical activities at technical research organisations
and universities. In the COPSAR project, thermal hydraulic ex-
periments were conducted at Lappeenranta University of Tech-
nology in Finland (LUT) and the collected data were used at Royal
Institute of Technology in Sweden (KTH) and VTT Technical
Research Centre of Finland (VTT) in their analytical work. In the
DECOSE project, experiments on different topics within ‘severe
accidents’ were conducted at both VTT and KTH and analytical
work was performed at both sites. The projects in the area of ‘risk
analysis and probabilistic methods’ also cover model development
and modelling of an analytical tool and involve a number of
consultant companies together with industry as partners, see
below e.g. the L3PSA project led by Lloyd’s Register Consulting in
Sweden (LRC).
Workshops and case studies are often used as methods in the
projects in the area of ‘organisational issues and safety culture’.
These are often led by technical research organisations, e.g. LESUN
led by Institute for Energy Technology in Norway (IFE) and SC_AIM
led by VTT, which are both done in collaborationwith industry. The
projects within the area of ‘decommissioning’ have a broad range of
partners from technical research organisations, authorities, in-
dustries and consultant companies, both in the ongoing NORDEC
project and the latest NKS seminar on decommissioning that was
held in 2013.
In this article, examples from some activities that have been
conducted between 2012 and 2016 are presented in order to
illustrate the forms of collaborations that exist and to give some
examples of the safety topics that have been covered since the
Fukushima accident in 2011, see Table 1.Table 1
Overview of NKS projects discussed in this article.
Research area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Thermal hydraulics ENPOOL
Severe accidents DECOSE
ATR
Risk analysis & probabilistic methods L3PSA
A
Organisational issues & safety culture LESUN
Decommissioning
Plant life management and extension2. Thermal hydraulics
2.1. Containment pressure suppression systems analysis for boiling
water reactors (COPSAR)
The BWR containment is a complex system that includes many
elements, which affect each other’s operation. The elements are e.g.
the pressure suppression pool, spray and containment venting
systems for containment pressure control, blowdown pipes for
rapid steam condensation in case of a LOCA (Loss-of-Coolant Ac-
cident), in which the core is insufﬁciently cooled. There are also
spargers for the pressure vessel relief valves, strainers for water
supply to emergency core cooling and spray systems, nozzles and
strainers of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, vacuum
breakers, etc. There are a number of safety important scenarios,
where containment pressure suppression function operation can
be affected by (i) stratiﬁcation and mixing phenomena, (ii) in-
teractions with emergency core cooling system (ECCS), spray, RHR
system, ﬁltered containment venting system (FCVS), and (iii)
overall water distribution between containment compartments.
Such scenarios include (i) interplay between pool behaviour, di-
agnostics and operator procedures that can affect activation and
performance of ECCS and containment spray systems; (ii) small
LOCA; (iii) station blackout; (iv) leaking safety relief valve; (v) LOCA
with broken blowdown pipe; (vi) severe accidents; and (vii) steam
line breaks inside the radiation shield.
In the COPSAR project, the need is addressed for a validated
modelling tool for simulation of realistic accident scenarios with
interplay between phenomena, safety systems, operational proced-
ures, and overall containment performance. Investigations of the
phenomena that can affect pressure suppression function due to the
operation of the other equipment and systems in the BWR
containment are made. The experimental work is performed in the
PPOOLEX facility at Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT).
PPOOLEX is a downscaled model of a BWR containment, which
consists of a closed stainless steel vessel divided into two compart-
ments, drywell and wetwell, that can be pressurized and equipped
with different spray installations. Pre-test analysis and simulations
for selection of operational regimes and test procedures is per-
formed at KTH. Post-test analyses are made both at KTH and at VTT.
In a BWR, steam released from primary coolant system is
condensed in the pressure suppression pool. Thermal stratiﬁcation
in the pool affects pressure suppression capacity of the pool. Heat
and momentum sources generated by the steam condensation
deﬁne pool behaviour. Direct Contact Condensation (DCC) of steam
presents a challenge for contemporary modelling tools. In previous
work, the Effective Heat Source (EHS) and Effective Momentum
Source (EMS) models were proposed to simulate development of
thermal stratiﬁcation or mixing induced by steam injection into a
large pool of water.
The experimental results from several tests in the PPOOLEX2016 2017 2018 Funded networks
COPSAR LUT, VTT, KTH
SPARC KTH, VTT, LRC
CTH, VTT
LRC, VTT, ÅF, Risk Pilot, Vattenfall
DdGROUND VTT, SEI, ÅF, AAU, UU, GEUS
IFE, VTT, RAB
SC_AIM VTT, KTH
NORDEC IFE, VTT, ÅF, Fortum, Vattenfall,
SSM, STUK, NRPA, SIS
BREDA-RPV BREDA-RPV KTH, VTT, CTH
C. Linde et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 51 (2019) 647e653 649facility have been reported in the NKS report series; mixing tests
with a residual heat remover (RHR) nozzle [2], sparger tests [3],
spray tests [4], single spray nozzle tests [5] and sparger tests with
reduced number of injection holes [6]. For the RHR nozzle tests
particularly the effects of nozzle orientation, ΔT in the pool, injec-
tion water temperature and injection water mass ﬂow rate were
studied. The tests veriﬁed that orientation of an RHR nozzle plays
an important role in the success of the mixing process of a ther-
mally stratiﬁed pool. The injectionwater temperature and ﬂow rate
at the nozzle and ΔT in the pool have an effect on the mixing
process but it is not as dominant as the nozzle orientation.
The analytical work by VTT and KTH is reported in several re-
ports; e.g. pre-calculation of a PPOOLEX spray experiment [7] and
CFD calculations on the thermal stratiﬁcation and mixing in the
sparger tests [8], modelling of pool behaviour and the Direct Con-
tact Condensation (DCC) phenomena [9,10].
LUT, KTH and VTT have studied suppression pool phenomena
also in the ENPOOL project (2011e2014), see e.g. Refs. [11,12].
High pressure in the containment due to reduced pressure
suppression function is a safety concern for the containment
integrity since it is the last barrier to the surrounding environment.
The COPSAR and ENPOOL projects have provided important
experimental data on pool behaviour addressing stratiﬁcation and
mixing issues that enable validation of computer models and
realistic evaluation of safety margins in BWRs.
3. Severe accidents
3.1. Debris coolability and steam explosions (DECOSE)
Lower drywell ﬂooding is adopted in some Nordic BWRs as a
means of mitigation of core melt accident consequences. It is
assumed that upon reactor pressure vessel failure the melt will
fragment, quench and form a debris bed coolable by natural cir-
culation of water in a deep pool under the vessel. However, if the
debris bed is not coolable, or if there is an energetic steam explo-
sion when molten material meets water as it is released from the
vessel, containment integrity can be threatened, potentially leading
to release of radioactive materials into the environment.
VTT and KTH have collaborated in the DECOSE project to
develop experimental facilities at both sites in order to produce
data necessary for development of new models and codes for se-
vere accident analysis. These codes and models can be used to
address the long-standing technical issues of ex-vessel debris
coolability and steam explosions in Nordic BWRs. The goal of the
project was to reduce uncertainties in debris coolability and steam
explosion impact. The project had signiﬁcant co-funding, VTT
through the SAFIR2018 program (The Finnish Research Program on
Nuclear Power Plant Safety 2015e2018) and KTH through the APRI-
MSWI program (Accident Phenomena of Risk Importance e Melt-
Structure-Water Interactions).
A summary of the results of the experimental studies of debris
bed coolability in the COOLOCE program at VTT is presented in
Ref. [13]. The experiments addressed the effects of the debris bed
geometrical shape, which is a result of the melt jet fragmentation
and solidiﬁcation in a water pool. Six variations of the debris bed
geometry with different ﬂooding modes were examined in the
experiments, including a top-ﬂooded cylinder and ﬁve beds with
more complex, heap-like geometries. The experimental results in
Ref. [14] suggest that the heap-like shape of the debris bed is
favourable to coolability.
A study and comparison of data on coolability of particulate
beds packed with irregular multi-size particles is presented in
Refs. [15,16]. The data from COOLOCE are compared with that of
POMECO-FL and POMECO-HT facilities at KTH. The effectiveparticle diameters obtained from the experiments are discussed,
which is followed by the dryout heat ﬂux comparison. It is sug-
gested that the observed coolability variations are due to variations
in porosity of the particulate beds resulting from the ﬁlling pro-
cesses that were used in the experiments. It also includes the dis-
cussion over the possible factors (heaters’ geometry and porosity)
affecting the coolability of the bed.
The DECOSIM code has been developed for analysis of porous
debris coolability and further validated against COOLOCE data [17].
Debris bed cooling in post-dryout regimewas addressed. Analytical
models for prediction of the maximum temperature of the debris
and relative size of the dry zone as a function of overheating
parameter was proposed and validated against DECOSIM simula-
tions. In the study, the DECOSIM code was extended to in-vessel
coolability analysis.
In case of a core melt accident where the reactor pressure vessel
fails, the melt ejected from the lower head into the water pool may
be in the form of a continuous jet. A series of DEFOR-A (Debris Bed
Formatione Agglomeration) tests was carried out in order to clarify
the effect of the melt jet velocity on the particle size distribution
and fraction of agglomeration [18,19]. In these works phenomena
relevant to the debris bed formation and coolability were also
addressed experimentally and analytically.
A steam explosion is a fast fuel-coolant interaction that might
occur as molten core material is released into the ﬂooded lower
drywell. Steam explosions have three distinct stages: premixing,
triggering and propagation. In the premixing stage, the molten
corium is fragmented into the coolant due to thermohydraulic
forces. A large portion of the corium formsmolten drops suspended
in the coolant by vapour ﬁlm. A triggering pulse locally collapses
this instable liquid-vapour-liquid system. If the mixture properties
are favourable, the trigger propagates in the mixture collapsing all
the melt drops so that the thermal energy of the melt is almost
instantly transferred to the coolant causing instantaneous high-
pressure increase.
The effect of an ex-vessel steam explosion was analysed at VTT
via computational models using the MC3D code, a multiphase CFD
(computational ﬂuid dynamics) code for fuel coolant interactions
[20]. The focus of the analysis lies on the dynamic loads on the
cavity wall imposed by the explosion. Simulations were made to
analyse the effect of different triggering times on a standard case
with central break at the lower head of the reactor vessel. The re-
sults showed that as long as the mixture properties allow the
trigger to propagate then the resulting explosion behaves in a
similar way. Different side breaks scenarios were also tested but
here the mixture did not trigger. The sensitivity analysis was done
for melt temperature, coolant subcooling, cavity water level and
melt drop size. The results show that the parameter with the
strongest effect is the drop size formed in the premixing phase,
which is largely tied to the physical properties of the melt.
In an earlier sensitivity analysis [21], the three input parameters,
melt temperature, triggering time and ambient pressure, were
varied to see how changes in these affect the results. Among them,
changing the triggering time had the largest impact on the steam
explosion occurrence and strength. The melt temperature is not a
limiting factor in this case. The ambient temperature had no effect
on the explosion strength but instead on the probability of the
explosion to occur.
A study performed at KTH deals with the premixing and ex-
plosion phase calculations of a Nordic BWR ﬂooded drywell cavity,
using MC3D [22]. The main goal of the study was the assessment of
pressure build-up in the cavity and the impact loading on the
sidewalls. The study included a sensitivity analysis of the parame-
ters in modelling of fuel coolant interactions, to reduce uncertainty
in assessment of steam explosion energetics. Moreover, the effects
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explosion were investigated. In an earlier study [23], it was shown
that the amount of liquid melt droplets in the water is maximum
even before the jet reaches the bottom of the pool. In the explosion
phase, maximum pressure is attained at the bottom and the
maximum impulse on the wall is at the bottom of the wall. The
pressure attained and impulses on the wall are higher for bigger jet
diameters, bigger melt droplets and higher subcoolings.
An approach for analysis of steam explosion in Nordic BWR and
sensitivity of steam explosion impulse to the uncertain modelling
and scenario parameters has been developed using the TEXAS-V
code [17]. The Texas-V is a code for analysis of gas, liquid and fuel
particles. It comprises two modules: one for calculation of pre-
mixing and another one for calculation of steam explosion. The ﬁrst
results indicated that the most inﬂuential parameters are water
level and water temperature [24]. Extensive simulations using the
TEXAS-V revealed that explosion impulse is a chaotic function of
the triggering time [17]. The obtained database of impulse and
pressure is used in the development of a computationally efﬁcient
tool for assessment of ex-vessel steam explosion risk in Nordic
BWRs. This modelling approach is further developed in the ongoing
SPARC project (see below).
3.2. The effect of aerosols and air radiolysis products on the
transport of ruthenium (ATR)
The behaviour of the ﬁssion product ruthenium in a model
primary circuit during a severe accident has been studied by VTT
and Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden (CTH) in the ATR
project [25]. The radiotoxicity of ruthenium oxides is similar to that
of iodine in the short term and similar to that of caesium in the long
term. All experiments were conducted using VTT’s Ru transport
facility. The results show that the impact of additional NO2 gas feed
(75 ppm volume) to the ﬂow of ruthenium oxides (in humid air)
was signiﬁcant both on the transport of ruthenium through the
facility and on the speciation of the transported ruthenium.
Transport of gaseous RuO4 was increased signiﬁcantly, whereas at
the same time the amount of aerosols was decreased.
The following year the effect of additional air radiolysis products
N2O, NO2, HNO3 [26] and CsI aerosol [27] on the transport of
gaseous and particulate ruthenium species through a model pri-
mary circuit was studied. In the experiments, nitrogen oxides as
well as nitric acid originating from air radiolysis had a signiﬁcant
effect on the ruthenium chemistry in themodel primary circuit. The
obtained results indicate a strong effect of air radiolysis products on
the quantity of transported ruthenium and its partition to gaseous
and aerosol compounds.
3.3. Scenarios and phenomena affecting risk of containment failure
and release characteristics (SPARC)
The SPARCproject is a collaboration betweenKTH, LRC andVTTon
scenarios and phenomena affecting risk of containment failure and
release characteristics. The work is co-supported by the APRI-MSWI
program, co-funded by APRI and ENSI (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety
Inspectorate), CASA (Comprehensive Analysis of Severe Accidents)
and PRAMEA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment Method Development
and Applications) projects in the frame of the SAFIR2018 program.
The work is co-funded also by VTT and the Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment Fund and fromLRC’s own research funds. The project involves a
number of young scientists in both Sweden and Finland.
The project is motivated by an apparently high sensitivity of
effectiveness of severe accident management (SAM) strategy in
Nordic type BWR to the uncertainties in physical phenomena
(deterministic) and accident scenarios (stochastic). The ROAAMþ(Risk-Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology) approach is
employed in order to address both epistemic (systematic) and alea-
tory (statistical) sources of uncertainty in a consistent manner. In the
ﬁrst report [28], the state of the art reviewof IntegratedDeterministic
Probabilistic Safety Analyses (IDPSA) is presented. The ROAAMþ
framework addressing all stages of the accident progression from
initial plant damage states, through core degradation and vessel
failure, melt ejection mode to ex-vessel melt-coolant interactions
and debris coolability, is discussed in detail along with imple-
mentation details of the ROAAMþ framework itself. Main ﬁndings of
the analysis of effectiveness of SAM strategy in Nordic BWRs using
ROAAM þ framework and main results are presented using failure
domain maps, which indicate conditions at which the mitigation
strategy of the SAM fails. The outcome of this ongoing project will
allow the end users to enhance understanding, completeness and
consistency of safety analysis dealing with risk analysis.
4. Risk analysis and probabilistic methods
4.1. Addressing off-site consequence criteria using level 3 PSA
(L3PSA)
Level 3 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (Level 3 PSA) provides a tool
to assess the risks to the society posed by a nuclear plant, and could
be integral in making objective decisions related to the off-site risks
of nuclear facilities. Results from the site components and human
factors (Level 1 PSA) and the severe accident and radioactive source
term analysis (Level 2 PSA) are incorporated with meteorological
data, radionuclide release data, population and agricultural data to
estimate the risks to the public in terms of health, environmental
and economic effects. The interest in this topic has risen within the
Nordic region, and around the world, mainly as a consequence of
the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
The goal of the L3PSA project has been to develop Nordic un-
derstanding of the potential for Level 3 PSA to determine the in-
ﬂuences and impacts of off-site consequences, the effectiveness of
off-site emergency response, and the potential contributions of
improved upstream Level 1 and Level 2 PSAs. The project has
included four of the leading Nuclear Risk Analysis consultancies in
the Nordic countries (Lloyd’s Register Consulting, ÅF, Risk Pilot, and
VTT), and also Vattenfall in the ﬁnal year of the project. The group
has conducted a survey to develop a baseline for the state of
knowledge, the opinions, and interests concerning Level 3 PSA.
They also performed a study of potential risk metrics, e.g. the
probability per reactor year versus consequences such as health
effects, environmental or economic impact, a summary of regula-
tions and standards, as well as one Swedish and one Finnish pilot
study. The outcome from these activities provided input into the
document Level 3 PSA Guidance for Nordic Conditions with user
recommendations that were presented at a seminar in 2017 and
that is included in the L3PSA ﬁnal report [29].
4.2. Modelling as a tool to augment ground motion data in regions
of diffuse seismicity (ADdGROUND)
After the Fukushima accident, seismic safety of nuclear power
plants and other nuclear installations has become an increasingly
important topic also in regions with low seismic activity, including
the Nordic nuclear sites. The technical aim of the ADdGROUND
project was to refresh existing and to build new capabilities in
earthquake source modelling for ground motion simulations in the
context of stable continental regions, speciﬁcally the Fenno-
scandian shield. Another aim was to establish and maintain a
network of experts focused on diffuse seismicity areas of the Nordic
countries and further enhance the cooperation between VTT and
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ling. The project also involved University of Helsinki, Institute of
Seismology (SEI), ÅF-Consult (ÅF), Aalto University (AAU) and
Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS).
The focus in the ﬁrst report lies on mid-magnitude earthquakes
located near the plant [30]. This region is called the “near-ﬁeld” and
is known for its particularities when compared to “far-ﬁeld”. For
example, signiﬁcant duration of the ground motions is shorter,
corresponding to shear wave and surface wave arrivals; there are
distinctive high velocity peaks in the ground motions and vertical
shaking components may exceed horizontal components. These
particularities are known to have design consequences, but are
often overlooked by engineering codes. In Fennoscandia, near-ﬁeld
observations of larger magnitude (M > 3) earthquakes are missing.
Some of the potential design consequences of near-source earth-
quakes to nuclear installations are highlighted in the report. The
consensus seems to be that the destructive potential of these types
of earthquakes is generally low. However, they can produce sur-
prisingly larger acceleration values in the range of high frequencies,
and can generate high strain rates in the loaded structures and
components. In nuclear installations, with stiff components, the
effect of high frequency shaking should be carefully considered.
The moment magnitude of the simulated earthquakes is
Mw ¼ 5.5, which corresponds approximately to the magnitudes of
the largest historic events in the region. The modelling techniques
are described in the second report [31], in which the modelling
outcomes are compared with ground motion prediction equations
(GMPEs) developed for stable continental regions. The results of the
project are of great signiﬁcance for the seismic assessment of
structures, systems and components in nuclear facilities.
5. Organisational issues and safety culture
5.1. Safety culture assurance and improvement methods in complex
projects (SC_AIM)
A good safety culture is an essential ingredient for ensuring
safety in the nuclear industry. Current safety culture and safety
management models and practices are largely focused on single
organisations, which are stable and relatively homogeneous, and it
is far from clear how to apply them in the dynamically changing
project networks.
The project SC_AIM is aiming at identifying and specifying
methods to improve, facilitate and assure safety culture in complex
projects [32]. In this collaboration between VTT and KTH, with
involvement from industry partners such as Fortum, Fennovoima,
OKG and Forsmarks Kraftgrupp, an initial literature review con-
cerning project environments revealed a multitude of project-
speciﬁc challenges and boundary conditions in the domains of
time, team, task and context that can potentially inﬂuence safety
culture assurance and improvement. Temporary organisational
forms are inherently time-delimited, which means that they have
deﬁned starting and ending points. The tasks are often speciﬁc,
ﬁnite, often unique and complex. This leads to conceiving time in a
linear manner and dividing the task into a number of consecutive
phases. Special team and group interdependencies also charac-
terize temporary organisations, where one challenge for the team is
to manage a diverse set of skills and knowledge without prior
collective working experience.
Three empirical case studies in Nordic nuclear industry orga-
nisations were conducted. In the ﬁrst case study, which focused on
the use of an in-house self-assessment team called “safety culture
ambassadors” to promote and facilitate safety culture improve-
ments. It was found that this method can inﬂuence safety culture
through multiple mechanisms and that the ﬂexibility of thismethod can potentially rectify some of the challenges posed by
project environment, or even beneﬁt from them. Another case
study focused on a safety-oriented project management seminar
and showed the potential of this method in inﬂuencing safety
culture through providing a forum for dialogue between different
stakeholders. Finally, information exchange with experts provided
additional insight into the current challenges and opportunities of
safety culture work in projects. As a result of the theoretical and
empirical work, a preliminary framework for evaluating the
applicability of safety culture assurance and improvement methods
has been developed.
5.2. Learning from successes in nuclear power plant operation
(LESUN)
Learning from experience is essential to achieve safe and efﬁ-
cient operations at nuclear power plants. In the nuclear industry,
licensees are required to collect lessons from unwanted events in
order to prevent the recurrence of similar events. The LESUN
project is a collaboration between IFE, VTT and Ringhals AB (RAB)
that aims at improving nuclear safety by enhancing organisational
learning from successful actions and decisions instead of from
failures [33]. The project wanted to develop an operating experi-
ence method for capturing, analysing and communicating lessons
learned based on successes.
From a literature review and two case studies in nuclear power
plants, the project found that success is a complex and multidi-
mensional concept that can take many forms. Three broad cate-
gories of success were identiﬁed: normal performances,
extraordinary performances and recoveries. It was also observed
that success can have properties such as time and situation-
dependence and that it relates to the objective or subjective ex-
pectations of multiple stakeholders. The project formulated a pre-
liminary framework for capturing successes that could be useful for
identifying successful situations for learning purposes. It was also
found that successes are often less salient and less likely to trigger
intentional learning processes than failures. Regardless, the
empirical studies indicate that there was a clear interest in suc-
cesses at the power plants: existing methods, albeit not very
reﬁned, were already in place that could be utilized to learn from
successes more systematically. Further developing these activities
is also important in order to avoid unwanted side-products of
learning from success such as organisational drift or complacency.
In addition, because lessons learned from success are often tacit,
exploring the possibilities of developing learning that relates to
tacit knowledge may be useful. Operating experience activities
have a central role in facilitating the development of these learning
activities.
6. Decommissioning
6.1. Challenges and opportunities for improving nordic nuclear
decommissioning (NORDEC)
Approaching large-scale nuclear decommissioning projects in
the Nordic countries make it important for both regulators and
operators to build new capabilities for handling up-coming chal-
lenges. Sweden and Finland both have a mixed legacy of nuclear
sites, including plants and research reactors in different stages of
operation or decommissioning, whereas in Denmark some
decommissioning projects have been completed for research re-
actors and others are well on the way to completion. In Norway,
while no immediate decommissioning activities are foreseen, the
existing decommissioning plans and regulations can be improved
by means of the information and lessons learned from the other
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NKS sponsored a decommissioning seminar at IFE in Halden,
Norway in 2013 [34]. The conference aimed to bring together op-
erators, regulators, scientists, consultants and contractors from the
Nordic countries (and invitees from other countries) to exchange
information and views on a number of the topics related to
decommissioning, release of materials andmanagement of waste. A
number of presentations about new knowledge and lessons
learned were given in addition to round table discussions where
issues and experiences of decommissioning from the Nordic
countries were discussed.
The NORDEC project, which started in 2017, is conducting a
study on how decommissioning is regulated, planned and per-
formed in the Nordic countries, in order to identify where the main
challenges lie, collect best practices and share experiences between
the Nordic participants. Awide span of stakeholders are involved in
the project; The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA),
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), Danish Health Authority
(SIS), Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), the
energy companies Fortum and Vattenfall, the consulting ﬁrm ÅF of
Sweden and VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland will partic-
ipate in the project, which is led by the Institute For Energy Tech-
nology (IFE) in Norway. The project involves collecting experiences
from completed and ongoing decommissioning-related activities in
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. The experiences’ evalua-
tion aims to identify possible improvements in processes, methods
and tools. The project will foster collaboration among Nordic
stakeholders through sharing of challenges and best practices.
7. Plant life management and extension
7.1. Barseb€ack as research and development platform, extraction
and analysis of reactor pressure vessel material (BREDA-RPV)
Irradiation induced ageing of the weld material of the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) is a limiting factor from a long term operation
perspective. The closed Barseb€ack 2 reactor gives an opportunity to
harvest samples from the RPV, which was manufactured and wel-
ded with the same technique and high amounts of nickel and
manganese as many Nordic RPVs. A test program to analyse the as-
aged material properties has been prepared within BREDA-RPV
[35]. The work is ongoing and has been supported from both SSM
and SKC (Svenskt K€arntekniskt Centrum) in Sweden and by the
Finnish nuclear safety program, the SAFIR-program.
VTT, CTH and KTH have collaboratively prepared an extraction
outline to give the basis for further discussions with the Swedish
utilities regarding the materials extraction scheme and proposed
amounts of materials and positions in the RPV. The work at CTH
focused on base-line high resolution atom probe tomography
(APT), testing on un-irradiated material as well as sample materials
irradiated in a test reactor. VTT has performed a base-line testing
utilizing miniature fracture toughness testing samples of un-
irradiated RPV material obtained from the original tests of the
RPV of Barseb€ack 2. The actual retrieval of materials from Bar-
seb€ack, is foreseen to occur in 2018 and -19.
By this study, it is possible to verify the validity of the surveil-
lance specimen used for the monitoring of the RPV status, e.g. by
investigating whether the heat treatment of the surveillance sam-
ples gives representative values as compared to the RPV itself. It is
possible also to study the irradiation induced embrittlement of the
RPV by analyzing the degradation gradient in the RPV wall. A
possibility to acquire for example three or four trepan samples from
locations at different axial positions would make it possible to
study the metallurgic variability and different ageing phenomena
from thermal and radiation induced degradation: The core regionhas substantial neutron ﬂux, while the RPV top lid has a substantial
thermal component while the neutron ﬂux is orders of magnitude
lower. The upcoming study will be carried out at KTH, in strong
collaboration with CTH on micro-structural analysis, and VTT for
mechanical testing.
8. Summary and conclusions
NKS-R funds research activities with particular relevance for the
Nordic development of research within reactor safety. The grants
are used to co-fund activities and add important value by facili-
tating the coordination of existing collaborations. The NKS-R covers
programs within the areas of ‘severe accidents’, ‘thermal hydrau-
lics’, ‘risk analysis and probabilistic methods’, ‘organisational issues
and safety culture’, ‘decommissioning’and ‘plant life management
and extension’, ‘reactor physics’ and ‘automation and control room’.
The activities involve experimental and analytical studies, work-
shops, case studies and seminars, and bring together technical
research organisations, universities, authorities, industries and
consultant companies from the Nordic countries. There is also a
particular focus on facilitating the competence building and
development among young scientists.
As exempliﬁed in this report, the NKS-R program provides
support with high additionality particularly in smaller R&D pro-
jects and pilot projects, and offers the opportunity for network
building and valuable collaborations between experts at the lead-
ing Nordic research facilities within reactor safety.
Acknowledgement
NKS conveys its gratitude to all organisations and persons who
by means of ﬁnancial support or contributions in kind have made
the work presented in this report possible.
References
[1] SSM 2017:09, Evaluation of the Swedish Participation in the Nordic Nuclear
Safety Research (NKS) Collaboration, SSM Report 2017:09, 2017. ISSN: 2000-
0456.
[2] NKS-383: Puustinen, M.; Laine, J.; R€as€anen, A.; Kotro, E. (2017) Mixing Tests
with an RHR Nozzle in PPOOLEX, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-
469-7.
[3] NKS-382: Puustinen, M.; Pyy, L.; Laine, J.; R€as€anen, A. (2017) Sparger Tests in
PPOOLEX on the Behaviour of Thermocline, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN
978-87-7893-468-0.
[4] NKS-384: Puustinen, M.; R€as€anen, A.; Kotro, E. (2017) Preliminary Spray Tests
in PPOOLEX, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-470-3.
[5] NKS-365: Pyy, L. (2016) Single Spray Nozzle Tests, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark,
ISBN 978-87-7893-450-5.
[6] NKS-364: Puustinen, M.; Laine, J.; R€as€anen, A. (2016) Additional Sparger Tests
in PPOOLEX with Reduced Number of Injection Holes, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-449-9.
[7] NKS-367: P€attikangas, T. (2016) Pre-calculation of a PPOOLEX Spray Experi-
ment, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-452-9.
[8] NKS-389: Huhtanen, R.; P€attikangas, T. (2017) Simulation of PPOOLEX Strat-
iﬁcation and Mixing Experiment SPA-t1, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-
87-7893-475-8.
[9] NKS-369: Gallego-Marcos, I.; Villanueva, W.; Kudinov, P. (2016) Thermal
Stratiﬁcation and Mixing in a Large Pool Induced by Operation of Spargers,
Nozzles, and Blowdown Pipes, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-
454-3.
[10] NKS-393: Gallego-Marcos, I.; Villanueva, W.; Kudinov, P. (2017) Modelling of
a Large Water Pool during Operation of Blowdown Pipes, Spargers, and
Nozzles, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-481-9.
[11] NKS-333: Pyy, L.; Telkk€a, J. (2015) PIV Measurements of DCC-06 and DCC-07
PPOOLEX Experiments, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-414-7.
[12] NKS-334: Laine, J.; Puustinen, M.; R€as€anen, A. (2015) PPOOLEX Experiments
with a Sparger, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-416-1.
[13] NKS-374: Takasuo E. (2016) A Summary of Studies on Debris Bed Coolability
and Multi-dimensional Flooding, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-
459-8.
[14] NKS-343: Takasuo,E.; Taivassalo, V.; Kinnunen, T.; Lehtikuusi, T. (2015)
Coolability Analyses of Heap-shaped Debris Bed, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark,
ISBN 978-87-7893-425-3.
C. Linde et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology 51 (2019) 647e653 653[15] NKS-318: Thakre, S.; Ma, W.; Bechta, S. (2014) Study and Comparison of Data
on Coolability of Particulate Beds Packed with Irregular Multi-size Particles,
NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-398-0.
[16] NKS-288: Thakre, S.; Ma, W.; Kudinov P.; Bechta, S. (2013) Study on Effective
Particle Diameters and Coolability of Particulate Beds Packed with Irregular
Multi-size Particles, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-363-8.
[17] NKS-370: Kudinov, P.; Konovalenko, A.; Grishchenko, D.; Yakush, S.; Basso, S.;
Lubchenko, N.; Karbojian, A. (2016) Experimental and Analytical In-
vestigations of Debris Bed Formation, Spreading, Coolability, and Steam Ex-
plosion in Nordic BWRs, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-455-0.
[18] NKS-317: Kudinov, P.; Konovalenko, A.; Grishchenko, D.; Yakush, S.; Basso, S.;
Lubchenko, N.; Karbojian, A. (2014) Analysis of Debris Bed Formation,
Spreading, Coolability, and Steam Explosion in Nordic BWRs, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-397-3.
[19] NKS-287: Kudinov, P.; Konovalenko, A.; Grishchenko, D.; Yakush, S.; Basso, S.;
Lubchenko, N.; Karbojian, A. (2013) Investigation of Debris Bed Formation,
Spreading and Coolability, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-362-1.
[20] NKS-375: Strandberg, M. (2016) Ex-vessel Steam Explosion Analysis with
MC3D, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-460-4.
[21] NKS-344: Strandberg, M. (2015) Analysing Steam Explosions with MC3D, NKS,
Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-426-0.
[22] NKS-319: Thakre, S.; Ma, W. (2014) Sensitivity Study of Steam Explosion
Energetics in Reference Nordic BWR Using MC3D Code, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-399-7.
[23] NKS-289: Thakre, S.; Ma, W. (2013) Simulations of Ex-vessel Fuel Coolant
Interactions in a Nordic BWR Using MC3D Code, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN
978-87-7893-364-5.
[24] NKS-346: Kudinov, P.; Konovalenko, A.; Grishchenko, D.; Yakush, S.; Basso, S.;
Lubchenko, N.; Karbojian, A. (2015) Analysis of Debris Bed Formation,
Spreading, Coolability, and Steam Explosion in Nordic BWRs, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-428-4.
[25] NKS-340: Kajan, I.; K€arkel€a, T.; Tapper, U.; Johansson, L.-S.; Gou€ello, M.;
Rameb€ack, H.; Holmgren, S.; Auvinen, A.; Ekberg, C. (2015) Impact of Aerosols
on the Transport of Ruthenium in the Primary Circuit of Nuclear Power Plant,
NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-422-2.[26] NKS-371: Kajan, I.; K€arkel€a, T.; Auvinen, A.; Ekberg, C. (2016) ATR-2 Part A:
Ruthenium Chemistry and Transport in a RCS Due to Air Radiolysis Products,
NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-456-7.
[27] NKS-396: K€arkel€a, T.; Kajan, I.; Tapper, U.; Auvinen, A.; Ekberg, C. (2017) ATR-
2 Part B: Ruthenium Transport in an RCS with Airborne CsI, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-484-0.
[28] NKS-395: Kudinov, P.; Galushin, S.; Grishchenko, D.; Yakush, S.; Adolfsson, Y.;
Ranl€of, L.; B€ackstr€om, O.; Enerholm, A. (2017) Scenarios and Phenomena
Affecting Risk of Containment Failure and Release Characteristics, NKS, Ros-
kilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-483-3.
[29] NKS-386: Olsson, A.; Wallin Caldwell, A.; Johanson, G.; Holmberg, J.-E.; Kar-
anta, I.; Fritioff, K. (2017) Addressing Off-site Consequence Criteria Using Level
3 PSA, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-472-7.
[30] NKS-363: Fül€op, L.; Jussila, V.; Lund, B.; F€alth, B.; Voss, P.; Puttonen, J.; Saari, J.;
Heikkinen, P. (2016) Modelling as a Tool to Augment Ground Motion Data in
Regions of Diffuse Seismicity - Progress 2015, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN
978-87-7893-448-2.
[31] NKS-394: Fül€op, L.; Jussila, V.; Lund, B.; F€alth, B.; Voss, P.; Puttonen, J.; Saari, J.;
Heikkinen, P. (2017) reportModelling as a Tool to Augment Ground Motion
Data in Regions of Diffuse Seismicity e Final Report, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark,
ISBN 978-87-7893-482-6.
[32] NKS-381: Viitanen, K.; Gotcheva, N.; Rollenhagen, C. (2017) reportSafety
Culture Assurance and Improvement Methods in Complex Projects e Inter-
mediate Report, NKS, Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-467-3.
[33] NKS-354: Viitanen, K.; Bisio, R.; Axelsson, C.; Koskinen, H.; Liinasuo, M.;
Skjerve, A. B. (2015) reportLearning from Successes in Nuclear Power Plant
Operation - Intermediate Report from the NKS-R LESUN, NKS, Roskilde,
Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-438-3.
[34] NKS-299: Mark, N.-K. (2014) NKS-R Decommissioning Seminar 2013, NKS,
Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-375-1.
[35] NKS-385: Efsing, P.; Boåsen, M.; Ehrnsten, U.; Lindqvist, S.; Wallin, K.;
Thuvander, M. Lindgren, K. (2017) Barseb€ack as Research and Development
Platform, Extraction and Analysis of Reactor Pressure Vessel Material, NKS,
Roskilde, Denmark, ISBN 978-87-7893-471-0.
